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Fair Division
MICHAEL J. MEURERt

INTRODUCTION

Fair division is a fundamental issue of legal policy. The
law of remedies specifies damages and rules of contribution
that apportion liability among multiple defendants.1
Probate law specifies how assets from an estate are divided
when the intentions of a decedent are unclear.2 Family law
specifies how assets from a dissolved marriage are apportioned.! Similarly, partnership law specifies how assets
from a dissolved partnership are apportioned.4 Bankruptcy
law specifies how the assets of a debtor are apportioned
among creditors.' In civil actions in which the plaintiff is
successful but failed to mitigate, the damages are apportioned between the defendant and plaintiff.' When courts or
legislatures create or modify property rights they implicitly
make choices about wealth allocation. For some public
t Associate Professor of Law, University at Buffalo. I am grateful to Nancy
Staudt and Jim Wooten for comments on an earlier version of this review
1. See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Joint and Multiple
Tortfeasors:An Economic Analysis, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 517 (1980).
2. See generally Trust Decisions Alleged Oral Agreement Among Heirs as to
Division of Estate Could be Enforceable without any Requirement of Court
Approval, Hennessey v. Froehlich, 464 S.E.2D 246 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) 113
BANKINGL.J. 848 (1996).
3. See generally Amy L. Wax, Bargainingin the Shadow of the Market: Is
There a Future for EgalitarianMarriage?84 VA. L. REV. 509 (1998); Honorable
Willis J. Zick, Divorce Law: Exclusions and DisproportionateDivisions of the
MaritalEstate, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 519 (1993).
4. See generally Alan R. Bromberg, Partnership Dissolution - Causes,
Consequences, and Cures, 43 TEX. L. REV. 631 (1965).
5. See generally 1 NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC. 2D §3:12 (providing an
overview of liquidation).
6. See generally Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The
Model of Precaution,73 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1985).
7. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral,85 HARv. L. REV.
1089 (1972).
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projects the government apportions the cost of the projects
among users. 8 Despite the importance of this issue, law

professors have largely ignored a small, but flourishing,
band of economic theorists who study questions of fair

division.0 In this book review I suggest a starting point for

such analysis.
Herv6
Moulin,
the
author
of
Cooperative
Microeconomics: A Game-Theoretic Introduction, and H.
Peyton Young, the author of Equity: In Theory and
Practice,2 are two of the economic theorists working to
move the study of fairness into the mainstream of economic
analysis. In the introduction to his book, Moulin laments:
"To the majority of economists today, the ethical choices of
distributive justice are alien to economic analysis... The
standard view simply incorporates... concerns about
justice (distributive and otherwise) in the description of
individual characteristics: some of us derive utility from
giving to the needy, some of us do not."" It is no surprise
that fairness does not play a significant role in law and
economics since it does not play much of a role in any area

8. See infra text accompanying note 55.
9. See e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 461-63 (1992)
(devoting only two pages to a discussion of distributive justice); NICHOLAS
MERCURO AND STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM POSNER TO
POST-MODERNISM 188-89 (1997) (arguing that the efficiency focus of economics
carries over to law and economics).
10. Four Nobel prize winning economists who have studied fairness issues
are: AMARTYA K. SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES (1985) (discussing the
moral status of preferences in welfare economics); Kenneth Arrow, Rational
Choice Functions and Orderings, 26 ECONOMETRICA 121 (1959) (noting the
aggregation of individual preferences by a social preference ordering); John
Harsanyi, Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of RiskTaking, 61 J. POL. ECON. 434 (1953); John Harsanyi, Cardinal Welfare,
Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisions of Utility, 63 J. POL.
ECON. 302 (1955) (foreshadowing Rawls with a theory of distributive justice
based on average expected utility maximization behind a veil of ignorance); and
John Nash, The BargainingProblem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 155 (1950) and TwoPerson CooperativeGames, 21 ECONOMETRICA 128 (1953) (discussing fairness in
bargaining problems).
11. HERVE MOULIN, COOPERATIVE MICROECONOMICS: A GAME-THEORETIC
INTRODUCTION 8 (1995).
12. H. PEYTON YOUNG, EQUITY: IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1994).
13. See MOULIN, supra note 11, at 8. Cf Henrik Lando, An Attempt to
IncorporateFairness into an Economic Model of Tort Law, 17 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 575 (1997) (building taste for fairness into the preferences of injurers and
victims).
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of applied economics.' 4 I hope my review of these two books
will pique some interest in this subject and promote legal
scholarship that incorporates fairness into the economic
analysis of law. 5
The main topic of the two books is the microeconomic
analysis of methods for fairly allocating benefit and cost.
The authors are eclectic and do not insist on a single
preferred mode of fairness analysis. Moulin advocates a
three-pronged approach that combines some notion of endstate justice with procedural requirements related to
voluntary participation and voluntary disclosure of personal
information." Young also discusses procedural and endstate justice in various economic models, but does not
suggest a unified theory.'7 In both books, procedural
questions are subsidiary to end-state questions. Procedure
is usually studied in the following terms: Given method X
achieves desirable results in terms of end-state justice, can
we find a way to implement X that allows the affected
parties to participate voluntarily, subject to reasonable
14. See generally EDWARD ZAJAC, POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FAIRNESS 76 (1995)
(noting that economists split efficiency from fairness analysis and leave the
consideration of fairness to policy-makers).
15. My Westlaw search found no citations to the book by Moulin. The book
by Young was cited by the following five authors: Richard O'Brooks, Legal
Realism, Norman Williams, and Vermont's Act 250, 20 VT. L. REv. 699 (1996);
Kirsten Engel, Reconsideringthe National Market in Solid Waste: Trade-offs in
Equity, Efficiency, Environmental Protection, and State Autonomy, 73 N.C. L.
Rev. 1481 (1995); Ugo Mattei, Efficiency as Equity: Insights from Comparative
Law and Economics 18 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 157 (1994); Larry T.
Garvin, Disproportionalityand the Law of Consequential Damages: Default
Theory and Cognitive Reality, 59 01O ST. L.J. 339 (1998); and Amy L. Wax,
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market: Is There a Future for Egalitarian
Marriage? 84 VA. L. REV. 509 (1998). I frequently attend meetings of the
American Law and Economic Association and I have never witnessed a presentation that used the cooperative microeconomic analysis that I will describe in
this book review.
16. See MOULIN, supra note 11, at 3 ("I submit that cooperation between
selfish economic agents can be conceived in three fimdamental "modes," namely,
direct agreement, justice, and decentralized behavior.") He also con-tends that
an ideal cooperative mechanism should be just, stable, and imple-mentable via
a unique equilibrium. Id. at 4.
17. Young argues that allocation methods tend to follow one of three
conceptions of fairness (he uses the term equity): parity, proportionality, or
priority. See YOUNG, supra note 12 at 8. Parity corresponds to equal treatments
of equals. Priority is invoked as the fair way to address the allocation of
indivisible goods. The good is given to the party with the highest priority based
on some measure of merit. See id.
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constraints on the government's behavior? 8
As in Moulin and Young, most of my comments in this
review concern end-state justice. The two simple allocation
methods that serve as the starting point for the analysis of
end-state justice find their origin in the Aristotelian theory
of distributive justice: equal cost (or benefit) sharing and
proportional cost (or benefit) sharing. 9 Consider the
following illustration. A man wins the lottery and decides to
make a gift of $1 million to his divorced parents. He could
choose equality and give one-half million dollars to each, or
he could choose proportionality and give $600,000 to his
mother in recognition that her life expectancy is fifty
percent longer.
Moulin and Young consider many variations on both
themes and insist that there is no single fair method of
division. Each new context demands a new analysis of the
advantages and disadvantages of different methods. For
example, if we change the context of the son's fair division
problem by awarding him a car rather than cash in the
lottery, his new division problem is more difficult. The car is
not divisible. He might sell the car and divide the proceeds
as above. But that approach is not always acceptable. No
market exists for some items, such as organs available for
transplant." Furthermore, the market may not capture the
idiosyncratic valuation of an item.2' Suppose that the car is
a unique antique that the mother would dearly love to own.
Also suppose the father would prefer cash. What's a poor
son to do? Should he try to equalize the monetary value of
18. Fair process is discussed in Part V.

19. According to Aristotle, equal treatment is required when individuals are
the same in terms of merit or blame. When individuals differ in a morally
relevant way (for example, some work harder, or some are more costly to serve)
then benefit or cost should be allocated in proportion to some factor that
captures the difference. See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 64; ZAJAC, supra note 14,
at 105.
20. Young devotes two chapters to the fair allocation of indivisible benefits.
He chooses topics like the allocation of organs for transplants and the apportionment of legislative seats to illustrate his discussion. See YOUNG, supra note
12, at 20-62.
21. See W. KIP VIscusI, JOHN M. VERNON, AND JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON,
ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 629-52 (1992) (developing methods

for valuing life and other non-market commodities). Cf Margaret Jane Radin,
Market Inalienability,100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987) (discussing problems with
commodification and assignment of market value); Margaret Jane Radin,
Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE. L. J. 56 (1993) (noting
problems with market valuation of bodily integrity).
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his gifts or their utility value? Is it possible to compare the
happiness of his mother and father? What if he cannot
afford a large cash gift to his father if he gives the car to his
mother?
As the son's quandary suggests, several difficulties
plague the analysis of fair division. There are many ways to
formulate the rule that a fair share should be responsive to
relevant differences. The correct definition of proportional
sharing is not obvious when there are heterogeneous individuals who differ in many morally relevant respects.22 The
correct definition is also not obvious when there are many
choices about how to measure differences.'
Once a fair end-state is chosen there are still more
difficulties. First, methods that yield attractive end-states
might be associated with coercive or undemocratic procedures.24 Second, methods that are attractive in a world of
full information might not be feasible in a world where
participants cannot be induced or trusted to disclose
relevant private information.' Finally, methods that give
fair end-states through fair and feasible processes may
generate perverse economic incentives.26 Moulin and Young
persevere despite these difficulties. They show the reader
how to devise satisfactory division methods that cope with
the features of a particular context.
One of the most attractive features of these books is
that both authors focus on local rather than global issues of
fairness.27 Other economic analyses of fairness pursue
global questions such as the nature of a just society or the
ideal social contract.28 In contrast, Young states that "this
22. See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 9 (indicating one problem with a
proportional rule is that there are different possible scales that can be used for
measurement).
23. See id.
24. See Herv6 Moulin, Proceduralcum Endstate Justice:An Implementation
Viewpoint, unpublished manuscript 11-12 (March 1997) (on file with Buffalo
Law Review).
25. See e.g., HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYsIs 256-59 (1984).
26. See infra text at Part IV.
27. See generally MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 6 (1983) (stating "I
want to argue... that the principles of justice are themselves pluralistic in
form; that different social goods ought to be distributed for different reasons, in
accordance with different procedures, by different agents; and that all these
differences derive from different understandings of the social goods
themselves-the inevitable product of historical and cultural particularism.").
28. See YOUNG, supra note 12, at xi. A central problem for political
philosophers is the social contract and a just social order. Much of the
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book.. .is about the meaning of equity in concrete
situations that we meet every day."29 He goes on to criticize
global theories by observing "theories of justice in the large
have little to say about what it means in the small. They do
not tell us how to solve concrete, everyday distributive
problems such as how to adjudicate a property dispute, who

should get into medical school, or how much to charge for a
subway ride."" I am attracted to a local theory of justice
because it supports a pragmatic attitude toward law and
policy-making. Local theories of justice recognize that law
and policy are compartmentalized; there are few chances for
compensation across different problems of fair division.31
In this review I intend to introduce the reader to some
valuable tools for analyzing concrete problems of distributive justice. The tools are found in cooperative microeconomics; especially cooperative game theory. I will illus-

trate the value of these tools by showing how they can be

applied to legal policy issues. I hope to convince the reader
that these methods deserve greater attention in the practice
of law and economics.
There are at least three roles for fairness analysis in
interesting work in economic theory that explores fairness issues is couched in
terms of the social contract, and is responsive to the theories of Hobbes,
Rousseau, Nozick, and Rawls. See generally ZAJAC supra note 12; KEN BINMORE,
PLAYING FAIR: GAME THEORY AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1994); KEN BINMORE,
JUST PLAYING: GAME THEORY AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1998); DANIEL M.
HAUSMAN AND MICHAEL S. MCPHERSON, ECONOMIC ANALYsIs AND MORAL
PHILOsOPHY (1996).
The other main strand of economic theory related to fairness arises from the
Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics. See e.g., VARIAN, supra note 25,
at 198-203. The First Theorem provides conditions under which a competitive
equilibrium is Pareto efficient. The Second Theorem states that any competitive
equilibrium can be implemented by the proper specification of property rights.
Law and economics scholars rely on the Second Theorem to justify legal
analysis that bifurcates efficiency and fairness analysis of the law. The usual
attitude is that law should be shaped by efficiency concerns, and the legislature
can achieve fairness through taxation and spending policies. See infra text at
Part IV. I will justify the local analysis of justice developed by Young and
Moulin below by arguing that the usual appeals to the Second Theorem are
unpersuasive in terms of microeconomics and in terms of political economy.
Furthermore, I argue that fairness depends on more than the distribution of
income. Economic analysis of the law needs to pay attention to fairness
concerns that arise when all of the parties affected by a law have similar income
and wealth, but differ in other morally significant dimensions.
29. See YOUNG, supranote 12, at xi.
30. Id. at6.
31. See YOUNG, supranote 12, at 6-7.
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law and economics: 2 (1) for many cooperative activities,
incentive problems are minimal and fairness is the only
way to guide the allocation of cost and benefit; 3 (2) when
Coasean conditions of low transaction costs prevail,34 then
property rights should be allocated according to fairness
criteria;" and (3) when policymakers want to consider
efficiency and fairness objectives simultaneously, then an
explicit description of fairness criteria allows an explicit
trade-off.36 This book review will touch on all of these roles
for fairness analysis. I work through two estate division
problems that do not present any incentive or efficiency
issues in Part I. I move to more complicated problems of fair
division in Part II wherein property rights and efficiency
issues are introduced. In Part III, I discuss the axiomatic
basis of the methods of fair division that are invoked in Part
II. I address the question of how traditional efficiency
analysis in law and economics can be integrated with
fairness analysis in Part IV. I conclude in Part V with
comments about procedural fairness and economic analysis.
As one final preliminary matter, I must comment on the
accessibility of these books. Young claims "the text is
intended to be a 'primer' and does not presuppose any
mathematical background, though a taste for logical argument and some familiarity with economic concepts would
certainly help,"37 and Moulin claims "this book is elementary and self-contained."38 When I was a graduate student
in economics I was always skeptical about such comments.39
32. Another role for fairness criteria is prediction of the outcomes of social
choices or bargains, especially when fairness can be used as a focal device to
choose among multiple equilibria. Since I am interested in normative issues, I
do not consider that role. See ZAJAC, supra note 14, at 7, 102-104 (discussing the
positive use of fairness in the study of the political economy of regulation).
33. Part I gives two examples of estate division problems in which no
efficiency issue is apparent.
34. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAw & ECON. 1
(1960).
35. See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 4-5 (arguing that equity should guide the
assignment of rights to newly created property and property that is excluded
from the market); MOULIN, supra note 11, at 164 (indicating that questions
about new property rights recur because of technical and economic change)
36. The trade-off between efficiency and fairness is covered in Part IV.
37. YoUNG, supra note 12, at xiii.
38. MOULIN, supra note 11, at 4.
39. A formative experience for me in graduate school involved reading the
famous Theory of Value. The book begins with the reassuring comment: "This
chapter presents all the mathematical concepts and results which will be used
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Of course, since I am urging law professors to read these
books, I do believe they are accessible. However, Young is a
significantly easier read than Moulin. Most of the
economics in Young is no more difficult than the economics
that follows in this Review. The same cannot be said about
Moulin's book, which is targeted at an audience with
significant economics training. Nevertheless, the first
chapter of Moulin's book is a delight to read and is accessible to all readers. Readers without strong economics
training will have to be content to skim the rest of the book.

I. Two EXAMPLES OF ESTATE DIVISION
The following two examples of the fair division of an
estate illustrate many of the issues central to the economic
analysis of fairness. Example one displays three possible
fair solutions to the basic problem of dividing money
between two parties. The multiplicity of solutions shows
that the choice of a reference point for evaluation of fairness
is critical. The example also shows that the choice of which
factor is morally relevant to a fair distribution will
sometimes be sufficient to determine how the money is
allocated. Example two modifies example one by replacing
money with personal property. This introduces the issues of
idiosyncratic valuation and interpersonal utility comparison. I also allude to two problems involved in implementing a fair division: wealth constraints and private information.
A. Example one4 °
Xerxes dies and leaves an estate of $300. He has told
his priest to divide the estate between his friends Yves and
Zack in accordance with instructions in a note he gave the
priest. Regrettably, the priest finds out that the
instructions direct him to give $200 to Yves and $300 to
Zack. The priest considers three possible fair divisions of
the estate. First, he could choose an egalitarian solution
later... Its reading requires, in principle, no knowledge of mathematics."
GERARD DEBREU, THEORY OF VALUE 1 (1959) (italics in original). Needless to say,
the chapter and the whole book was a struggle.
40. See YOUNG, supranote 12, at 67.
41. I assume that the priest cannot discern anything more about Xerxes'
intention.
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and give an equal amount of $150 to both men.42 Second, he
could give $100 to Yves and $200 to Zack. The justification
for this division is that Zack has an exclusive claim to the
last $100 in the estate so that $100 should go to Zack. The
first $200 in the estate can then be divided equally. The
dissatisfaction of Yves and Zack is equalized in the sense
that both men are $100 short of their claims. 3 Comparing
the first two solutions, it is easy to recognize a shift in a
background assumption. The first solution uses a reference
point in which Yves and Zack have nothing. The second
solution uses a reference point in which both have their
claims fully satisfied.4 As a third possibility, the priest
could follow probate law and abate the bequests in
roportion to the claims.45 In such a case, Yves gets (2/5) of
$300, or $120 and Zack gets (3/5) of $300, or $180.
B. Example tWo

4

1

Xerxes dies and leaves a painting to Yves or Zack. The
priest is told to do whatever seems fair. The painting has a
market value of $400. Yves attaches a higher value of $1000
to the painting because of sentimental reasons. Zack only
cares about the painting for its resale value. The first
solution that occurs to the priest is for Yves to receive the
painting and give $500 to Zack. The justification is that
both men gain $500 in value. The priest reconsiders when
Yves complains that he does not have $500 to give Zack.
Yves also mutters something about really only valuing the
painting at $410. The priest disregards Yves's claim that he
only values the painting at $410 because he can see in his
eyes that Yves really values it at $1000. The priest decides
on a second solution in which Yves receives the painting
and gives $200 to Zack. The new justification is that both
men suffer a loss of $200 compared to what they would
enjoy if they each somehow got an equivalent painting.
42. Equal division would be unattractive if Yves' claim was only $100 in
which case equal division would give him more than he was left in the note.
43. See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 67-69 (noting that this allocation method
comes from the Talmud and is called the contest garment rule).
44. See YOUNG, supranote 12, at 75-76 (noting that assessments of equality
depend on the choice of a baseline and a yardstick).
45. See WEST'S ANN. CAL. PROB. CODE §21403 (1999) (indicating that pro
rata abatement is used within a class of beneficiaries).
46. See MOULIN, supra note 11, at 20-22.
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Yves likes this proposal better and comes up with the $200.
Zack grumbles but acknowledges that $200 is half of the
market value of the painting. Nevertheless, he still thinks
that Yves is getting the better deal."
A division problem as simple as example two raises a
host of issues about choosing a fair end-state and also about
how to achieve that end-state. An efficiency issue appearsthe painting is worth more to Yves than to Zack. Later in
this review I will comment on trade-offs between efficiency
and fairness,48 but here I am content to observe that
efficiency itself may be a fairness consideration: Yves
should get the painting because he values it more. Of
course, the very question of how much Yves values the
painting is also an important issue. How can a fair endstate be achieved when parties hold private information? I
assumed that the priest knew Yves' valuation - normally
the judge, jury, arbitrator or legislature will not have all the
relevant information they need to choose a fair outcome."
The issue of a wealth constraint also surfaces in example
two. Is it fair to give the painting to Yves if he cannot or
will not make some payment to Zack? Finally, we must
confront the classic issue of interpersonal comparison. It is
possible to make some headway in resolving fairness
questions without making such comparisons, but the
exposition is easier and the methods are more powerful if
we allow comparisons. Thus my presentation follows the
usual welfare economics tradition."

47. Moulin points to one other fair division in which Yves takes the painting
and pays $350 to Zack. This allocation equalizes the gain of risk neutral parties
in comparison to a benchmark in which either Yves or Zack gets the painting
with one-half probability. See id. at x.
48. See infra text at Part IV.
49. See generally Bengt Holmstrom & Roger Myerson, Efficient and Durable
Decision Rules with Incomplete Information, 51 EcONOmETRICA 1799 (1983)
(discussing a social planner's problem in the face of private information).
50. An allocation is envy-free if no person prefers the allocation given to
someone else. Compare YOUNG, supra note 12, at 11 (stating the role for this
notion of equity is limited because it assumes that everyone has an equal claim
to whatever is being allocated with STEVEN J. BRAMS AND ALAN D. TAYLOR, FAIR
DIVISION: FROM CAKE CUTTING TO DISPUTE RESOLUTION 1-2 (1996) (indicating
that envy-free methods of fair division are central to their analysis).
51. See Young, supra note 12, at 12-13 (rejecting utilitarianism in the sense
of comparing people's happiness but says that interpersonal comparisons must
be made).
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II. COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY

One economic approach to dividing cost and benefit
relies on cooperative game theory. A cooperative game
consists of a list of players and a characteristic function."
The characteristic function indicates what payoff should be
assigned to every conceivable coalition of players. A coalition is any set of players, including singletons and the
entire set of players. There are different possible interpretations of the characteristic function. I will return to the
estate division examples to illustrate some cooperative
games and explain their characteristic functions.
The cooperative games that describe the two estate
division examples are similar. The list of players is Y and Z
(short for Yves and Zack). The characteristic function, v(),
associates a payoff with each coalition: {Y}, {Z}, {Y,Z}, and
the empty set 0. One possible characteristic function for
example one is:

v(O) = o,

v(Y) = 200,
v(Z) = 300
v(Y,Z) = 300.

The interpretation of v(Y) = 200 is that Yves could get
$200 from the estate if Zack did not exist. Similarly, Zack
could get $300 if Yves did not exist. Of course, the coalition
with no players creates no value. And finally, the pair can
cooperate and share the whole estate of $300. The same
type of reasoning leads to the following characteristic
function for example two:
v(0) = 0
v(Y) = 1000

v(Z) = 400
v(YZ) = 1000.

Given the specification of a cooperative game, the
economist uses a solution concept to determine the fair
division of cost or benefit between the players. Different
solution concepts are available. The leading solution concepts can be justified in terms of their axiomatic origin. In
this Part of the review, I will introduce two solution
concepts and in Part III I will explain the axiomatic approach to constructing a solution concept.
52. See id. note, at 85; MOULIN, supra note 12, at 402-427; MARTIN SHUBIK,
GAME THEORY IN THE SOcIAL SCIENCES 127-130 (1982).
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Essentially, a solution concept is a way to generalize
the Aristotelian proportionality principle. The two most
popular solution concepts are the Shapley value and the
nucleolus. The Shapley value determines the average
marginal benefit or cost associated with each player in each
possible coalition, and allocates that amount to each
player.53 The nucleolus, instead, picks the allocation that
minimizes the dissatisfaction of all possible coalitions of
cooperating individuals.54
Let me apply the Shapley value solution concept to the
first estate division problem. I will start with the allocation
to Yves. There are two possible coalitions that include Yves:
{Y} and {Y,Z}. The incremental benefit that Yves brings to
the coalition {Y,Z} is zero, because Zack alone gets v(Z) =
300 which is the same as the payoff to the pair, i.e., v(Y,Z) =
300. The marginal benefit that Yves brings to the coalition
{Y} is 200, because v(Y) = 200 and the payoff is zero to the
empty coalition, i.e., v(0) = 0. The Shapley value allocation
to Yves is the average of 0 and 200 or 100. Similarly, the
Shapley value for Zack averages the marginal contributions
made by Zack: namely, v(Z) - v(0) = 300, and v(Y,Z) - v(Y)
= 100. Thus his Shapley value allocation is 200.
The nucleolus gives the same allocation for this
problem. A payoff of 100 to Yves and 200 to Zack minimizes
the dissatisfaction of the various coalitions. The dissatisfaction of the coalition {Y} is measured by the gap between
the payoff specified for Y by the characteristic function v(Y)
= 200 and Y's actual allocation of 100. So Yves gets 100 less
than he is "entitled to" according to the characteristic
function. Similarly, Zack gets 100 less than v(Z) =300. The
coalition of Yves and Zack gets a total allocation of $100 +
$200 = $300 which just matches the payoff specified by the
characteristic function: v(YZ) = 300. There is no way to
rearrange the allocation of the estate between Yves and
Zack so that the dissatisfaction of at least one coalition
falls, and no coalition grows more dissatisfied. Thus we
have the nucleolus.
Compare these results to the discussion of example one
in Part I. In example one, the priest considered giving the
uncontested $100 portion of the estate to Zack and dividing
53. See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 69-71; See MoULiN, supra note 11, at 417423.
54. See YOUNG, supranote 12, at 93-96.
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the remaining $200 equally (yielding an allocation of $100
to Yves and $200 to Zack). The discussion of cooperative
games shows the same allocation can be derived using the
appropriate game and either the Shapley value or the
nucleolus solution concept. As the reader might expect, the
other allocations considered by the priest can also be
derived as solutions to a cooperative game. For example,
the allocation that splits the estate equally and gives $150
to both Yves and Zack comes from a cooperative game in
which v(O) = v(Y) = v(Z) = 0, and v(Y, Z) = 300. 55 The
interested reader can also verify that cooperative games can
be specified that have solutions that correspond to the two
allocations considered by the priest in the second estate
division example.56
The Shapley value and the nucleolus are not merely
obscure inventions by game theorists. The Shapley value
has been derived independently by non-economists in two
real-life settings. First, civil engineers developed a similar
scheme to allocate dam construction costs by the Tennessee
Valley Authority. 7 Engineers estimated the costs associated
with an actual dam and also with hypothetical dams that
would be built to serve the various possible coalitions of
users. The actual costs were then allocated to users based
on a method that approximated the Shapley value. More
surprising perhaps, distributors of used machinery devised
an ingenious scheme to allocate the surplus created by their
collusion at auctions.58 After official auctions ended, the
55. Instead of giving the singleton coalitions the payoff that they would
receive if the other claimant did not exist, in this cooperative game I assume
that neither claimant can take anything from the estate without the permission
of the other. Therefore, v(Y) = v(Z) = 0.
The priest also considered a proportional allocation in example one that gave
$120 to Yves and $180 to Zack. A natural specification of the characteristic
function also produces that outcome. Suppose that by acting alone Yves could
hire a lawyer at a cost of 100 and win a payment of 120 in a probate proceeding.
Similarly, Zack could hire a lawyer at a cost of 100 and win a payment of 180.
Then v(Y) = 20 and v(Z) = 80, and the Shapley value or nucleolus give $120 to
Yves and $180 to Zack.
56. In example two consider the following characteristic function: v(0) = 0,
v(Y) = 1000, v(Z) = 400, and v(Y,Z) = 1000. The nucleolus and Shapley value
both yield an allocation in which Yves gets 800 and Zack gets 200.
Alternatively, consider the characteristic function: v(O) = 0, v(Y) = 0, v(Z) = 0,
and v(YZ) = 1000. The nucleolus and Shapley value both yield an allocation in
which Yves gets 500 and Zack gets 500.
57. See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 86.
58. See Daniel Graham, Robert C. Marshall, & Jean-Frangois Richard,
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colluding bidders gathered and held a series of private (and
illegal) auctions open only to ring members to allocate the
machinery won by the collusive ring and to allocate the
financial gains derived at the expense of the auctioneer.
These private auctions were designed in such a way that
the collusive gain was allocated to ring members according
to the Shapley value.59
The nucleolus is a generalization of the contested
garment rule that appears in the Talmud as a rule for fair
division." The contested garment rule first appears in the
Babylonian Talmud nearly 2000 years ago, where its name
derives from the following problem: "Two hold a garment;
one claims it all, the other claims half. What is an equitable
division of the garment?"6 The answer given in the Talmud
is

3/4

to the party claiming the whole garment and

to the

other. Because there is no dispute that the first claimant is
entitled to half, the remaining, disputed portion is divided
equally." Other Talmudic writings extend this procedure to
estate division and partnership dissolution problems with
three claimants."
The Shapley value and the nucleolus give the same
allocation in the two-claimant estate division problems in
Part I. In general, however, the Shapley value and nucleolus yield different solutions to cooperative games. Take, for
example, the problem of apportioning damages between
three polluters. Suppose that Xerxes, Yves, and Zack
independently took actions that contaminated land owned
by Wilma. The pollution destroyed the value of the land and
caused a loss of 400 (measured in appropriate units, e.g.,
$400 million). Zack was responsible for the largest amount
of contamination and Xerxes the least. If Zack had not
Differential Payments within a Bidder Coalition and the Shapley Value, 80
AMER. ECON. REV. 493 (1990). The bidders involved in the collusive ring were
ultimately detected and prosecuted. See U.S. v. Seville Industr. Mach. Corp.,
696 F. Supp. 986 (D. N. J. 1988).
59. See Graham et al., supra note 58.
60. See YOUNG, supranote 12, at 93-96
6L See id. at 65.
62. I can illustrate the cooperative game associated with this problem by
designating the party claiming the whole garment A, and the other claimant B.
Let v(A) = 1, v(B) = , and v(A,B) = 1. The numbers represent a fraction of the
garment. The outcome in the Talmud is the nucleolus and the Shapley value for
the cooperative game. When there are more than two players the contested
garment rule generalizes to the nucleolus not the Shapley value.
63. See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 71.

19991

FAMR DIVISION

951

acted, the pollution by Xerxes and Yves would have caused
only 300 units of damage. If Xerxes had acted alone, the
harm would have been 100 units. Yves acting alone would
have caused 200 units of damage. Zack acting alone would
have caused 300 units of damage, and Zack paired with
either Xerxes or Yves would have caused a loss of 400. The
natural specification of the characteristic function is:
c(X) = 100
c(Y) = 200
c(Z) = c(X,Y) =300
c(X,Z) = c(YZ) = c(X,Y,Z) = 400.'

First, we find the Shapley value allocation for Yves. An
intuitive approach to the analysis is to imagine that the
damages are apportioned by means of a lottery. The three
polluters are randomly assigned the first, second, or third
position in a queue. Starting with the first person in the
queue, payments are made until Wilma recovers the 400
total. Payments are limited by the amount of damage that a
polluter would have caused if he had acted alone; thus, Yves
pays 200 at most. There are six possible outcomes of the
lottery: (XY,Z), (X,ZY), (Y,XZ), (Y,Z,X), (Z,X,Y), and
(Z,Y,X). Suppose the outcomes are equally likely. Yves is
first with probability (1/3) and pays 200. He is last with
probability (1/3) and pays 0, because Xerxes and Zack would
pay the 400 total. Yves is second behind Xerxes with
probability (1/6) and pays 200. Finally, Yves is second
behind Zack with probability (1/6) and pays 100 (because
Zack has already paid 300). These observations allow us to
calculate that the Shapley value allocation for Yves is
116(2/3).65 The Shapley value allocation for Xerxes is 66(2/3)
and for Zack it is 216(2/3).
In contrast, the nucleolus yields a payment of 50 by
Xerxes, a payment of 125 by Yves, and a payment of 225 by
Zack. This is the allocation that minimizes the dissatisfaction (in this case, it is easier to think of maximizing
satisfaction)of the various coalitions. Under this allocation
the least fortunate coalitions (IX} and {Y,Z}) enjoy a surplus
of 50. The coalition consisting of Xerxes created a cost of
c(X) = 100, but only has to pay 50, and therefore gets a
surplus of 50. The coalition of Yves and Zack created a cost
64. I use c( ) rather than v( ) to indicate that a cost not a value is associated
with each coalition.
65. (1/3 x 200) + (113 x 0) + (1/6 x 200) + (1/6 x 100).
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of c(YZ) = 400, but only has to pay 350, and therefore gets a
surplus of 50. The other coalitions get a higher surplus: jY}
and {Z} both get a surplus of:
75 = C(Y) - 125 = C(Z) - 225
and {X,Y} and {X,Z} both get a surplus of:
125 = C(XY) - 175 = C(X,Z) - 275.
Thus each of the least satisfied coalitions have the same
complaint-they got a surplus of just 50. But there is no
way to shift the payments to give every coalition a surplus
above 50. Consider that a smaller payment by Xerxes would
lead to a higher combined payment by Yves and Zack-with
the result being the surplus of {Y,Z} would fall below 50.
Likewise, raising the surplus to {Y,Z} would necessarily
reduce the surplus to Xerxes. Notice that the Shapley value
is not equivalent to the nucleolus because Xerxes gets a
surplus of only 33(1/3) from the Shapley value allocation.
I do not want to pause yet to compare the merits of the
two solutions. It is not obvious that either apportionment of
damages is fairer. The purpose of the example was to illustrate how the solution concepts are applied. I will move to a
more detailed example drawn from nuisance law to set the
stage for a normative evaluation of the two solution
concepts.
The private nuisance problem is a perennial concern in
law and economics." The standard analysis was fashioned
by Coase, who observed that parties can bargain to
eliminate inefficiencies associated with conflicting uses on
neighboring property." The Coase Theorem states that
parties will negotiate the efficient solution to a private
nuisance problem if transaction costs are low.68 Further, the
solution is independent of the assignment of property
rights.69 I will take the Coasean analysis of private nuisance
as a point of departure for the application of cooperative
game solution concepts to the question of the fair assignment of property rights.
Let me illustrate the issue with a dispute between three
parties: Ann, Bob and Carol. Suppose that Ann is engaged
in activity that interferes with the activities of Bob and
Carol. For example, Ann operates a gravel pit that generates dust that bothers Bob and Carol in their neighboring
66.
67.
68.
69.

See
See
See
See

e.g., POSNER, supra note 9, at 61-67.
Coase, supranote 34.
id.
id.
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homes. Alternatively, Ann plays loud music in her home
that bothers neighbors Bob and Carol, or Ann uses a
powerboat on a public lake in a way that disturbs Bob and
Carol while they are fishing.
To make the problem concrete I suppose that the
benefit to Ann from her activity is 4. Similarly, the benefit
to Bob and Carol from their activities if Ann disturbs them
is 4 each. If Bob and Carol are undisturbed, then their
benefit rises to 6 each. Ann's net benefit falls to 3 if she
modifies her activity so that it does not disturb Bob and
Carol. This is enough data to specify a cooperative game
and find a solution.7
The traditional Coasean argument in law and
economics holds that rights should be assigned in a way
that maximizes efficiency. Here, efficiency requires that
Ann refrain from the activity that diminishes the benefits
available to Bob and Carol. If transaction costs are low, it
does not matter how the rights are assigned, because the
parties will negotiate that outcome. Where transaction costs
are high, however, the Coasean argument favors
assignment of rights to Bob and Carol. In the following
discussion, I assume that transaction costs are sufficiently
low so that efficiency will be achieved regardless of how
property rights are assigned.
The game specification consists of a list of players: A, B
and C, and a characteristic function. The following characteristic function is just one of the possible functions consistent with the data in this problem.7 ' The payoff to Ann
acting alone is v(A) = 4. Similarly, the payoffs to Bob or
Carol acting alone are v(B) = v(C) = 4 in the face of Ann's
disruptive activity. If Ann cooperates with either Bob or
Carol, then the joint payoff they can achieve is v(A,B) =
v(A,C) = 9. Because Ann can mitigate her harm at a cost of
1 while the other party gains 2, the net benefit associated
with Ann's activity falls to 3, but the benefit from the other
party's activity rises to 6.72 The coalition of Bob and Carol
70. I use this exercise to build some intuition about how the private
nuisance problem should be resolved.
71. I will consider an alternative characteristic function later.
72. A background assumption in this version of cooperative game theory is
that utility is transferable between members of a coalition. Ann's sacrifice could
be induced within the coalition of Ann and Bob by Bob's offer to transfer a
benefit of at least 1 to Ann. The nominal net benefits of 3 to Ann and 6 to Bob
are not relevant to the coalition {A,B}; only the payoff v(AB) = 9 is relevant to
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only nets the sum of what they can achieve alone: v(B,C) =
8. Finally, the grand coalition of all three will achieve the
highest joint payoff if Ann mitigates her harm. The result is
a net benefit of 3 from Ann's activity, and 6 from the
activities of Bob and Carol so that v(A,B,C) = 15.
The Shapley value of this game allocates a utility to
each player that equals his or her average marginal
contribution to each coalition. The Shapley value for Ann is
5'/ To check the derivation of this result first notice that
Ann contributes 4 to the singleton coalition JAI. She
contributes v(A,B) - v(B) = 5 to the doubleton coalition {A,
B1. She makes the same contribution to the coalition {A, C.
Finally, she contributes v(A,B,C) - v(B,C) = 7 to the grand
coalition {A, B, C. Ann's Shapley value is the average of 4,
5, and 7, or 51,. Similar calculations for Bob and Carol yield
Shapley values of 45/s for each.73
The division of benefits given by the Shapley value can
be used to guide the assignment of property rights in this
nuisance problem. If Bob and Carol are assigned the right
to be free from interference by Ann and that right can be
enforced at no cost, then Bob and Carol will enjoy their full
benefits of 6 each and Ann will get a net benefit of 3. This
pattern of benefits departs considerably from the Shapley
value calculations that would give 51/3 to Ann and 4s to Bob
and Carol. In fact, assigning a right to Ann to choose
whatever activity she pleases is suggested by the Shapley
value calculation. In this case, efficiency dictates that Bob
and Carol make a payment to Ann to induce her to curtail
her interference with their activities. The total gain that
the coalition.
73. The reader might expect a different weighting of the marginal
contributions. The reader might guess that since there are four different
coalitions that include A (namely, {AI, (A, B), [A, C), and (A, B, C) each of these
marginal contributions should get a weight of one-fourth. The best explanation
for the weighting used to calculate the Shapley value is based on the following
heuristic. Suppose that A, B, and C come through a door in a random order. We
calculate A's marginal contribution to the coalition of agents who passed
through the door before her. There are six possible orderings: ABC, ACB, BAC,
BCA, CAB, and CBA. Each order is equally likely, so the marginal contribution
in each case is weighted by one-sixth. For the example in the text: if B comes
through the door first (BAC or BCA) the marginal contribution is 4; if B comes
through the door second and follows A (ABC) the marginal contribution is 5; if B
comes through the door second and follows C (CBA) the marginal contribution
is 4; and if B comes through the door third (ACB or CAB) the marginal
contribution is 6. Thus, the Shapley value for B is: (1/6)4 + (1/6)4 + (1/6) 5 +
(1/6)4 + (1/6)6 + (1/6)6 = 4(5/6).

1999]

FAIR DIVISION

955

the parties can share from an efficient arrangement is 3.74
Ann should get a payment of at least 1 to compensate for
the mitigation, and Ann could get as much as 3 in payment
if she is an extremely successful bargainer. Thus Ann
should enjoy a benefit between 4 and 7 depending on her
bargaining skill. An outcome where each party gets 5 seems
plausible and is much closer to the Shapley value.
If cooperative game theory in general and the Shapley
value in particular are of any real value to law professors, it
does not lie in Delphic pronouncements about fair outcomes.
Instead, the value must arise from some intu-itions about
fairness that come from applying the theory. So far, the
analysis supports an allocation of rights in favor of the
polluter (generally the party called upon to mitigate). This
is because Ann, the polluter, offers a valuable contribution
to the well being of neighbors Bob and Carol. If Ann
forbears from polluting, she offers a significant benefit to
either Bob or Carol or the pair, and the Shapley value
recognizes that contribution by rewarding her.
It may seem that the Shapley value solution is
somehow stacked in favor of the polluter. In fact, it is. The
problem, though, is not with the Shapley value solution
concept; rather, it lies in my specification of the characteristic function. While my specification was reasonable, it
is not the only reasonable specification. I will now revise the
characteristic function and recalculate the Shapley value.
The result will be a solution that is more favorable to Bob
and Carol. It is important to notice that the specifi-cation of
the characteristic function incorporates significant value
judgments.
In the first specification of the characteristic function, I
assumed that Ani's polluting activity was a background
condition that could affect any coalition. Now I reverse that
assumption and suppose that the absence of pollution is the
background condition. Recall that originally the singleton
coalition consisting of Ann was assigned a payoff v(A) = 4.
Now I reduce that payoff to v(A) = 3. Intuitively, even in
isolation Ann cannot choose the polluting activity without
permission. Alternatively, we can interpret the payoff v(A)
74. Bob and Carol both get a benefit of 2 while Ann loses 1.
75. This outcome arises when the parties split the gains from cooperation
equally. There is no consensus in economics about how bargains of this sort are
resolved. See generally, MARTIN OSBORNE AND ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, BARGAINING
AND MARKETS (1990).
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= 3 as meaning that Ann by herself only deserves the payoff
associated with her non-polluting activity. 76 I assumed that

the singleton coalition of Bob or Carol alone would suffer
the harm from Ann's pollution and so also get a payoff of 4.
I now change that assumption and assume that Bob and
Carol alone get a payoff of 6 (so that v(B) = v(C) = 6).
Continuing with the new assumptions, the pair of Bob and
Carol would get a payoff of 12 (so that v(B,C) = 12). The
payoff to the other coalitions is unchanged (so that v(A,B) =
v(A,C) = 9 and v(A,B,C) = 15. The Shapley value for this
alternative specification of the characteristic function yields
a payoff of 3 to Ann and 6 to Bob and Carol. 7
How do we evaluate which of the alternative
specifications of the characteristic function is correct? In
this setting I think that either can be defended. I might
choose a payoff to the singleton coalitions that reflects what
each party actually can achieve in isolation. That might
mean that Bob gets 6 because he can intimidate Ann until
she abates the dust from her gravel pit, turns down her
music, or keeps her boat from interfering with the fishing.
Of course, the opposite might also be true. Descriptive
realism is not necessarily required or desirable. I might
specify that v(B) = 6 because Bob deserves a benefit of 6
when he stands alone. Finally, I might specify payoffs to
coalitions based on either status quo or hypothetical
property rights.
Comparing the Shapley values obtained for the two
specifications, we see that Bob and Carol do better under
the new specification. The payoffs yielded by the new
Shapley value match the payoffs that result from giving
Bob and Carol the right to be free from interference by Ann.
The difference between the two specifications is that Ann's
marginal contributions are smaller under the new
specification because Bob and Carol do better without
Ann.78 Intuitively, the new analysis models the cooperative
76. Still another interpretation is that in the state of nature Bob and Carol
can prevent Ann from choosing the polluting activity by force.
77. Ann makes a marginal contribution of 3 to the singleton coaltion (A).
She makes a marginal contribution of 3 to either doubleton coalition. And she
makes a marginal contribution of 3 to the grand coalition. Averaging over all 3's
gives an allocation of 3 to Ann. For Bob or Carol, their marginal contributions
are 6 to every coalition that they might join, so they each get a Shapley value
allocation of 6.
78. Under the new specification Ann contributes 3 to the coalition (A)
compared to 4 before, she contributes 3 to the coalitions (A, B) and (A, C)
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problem in a way that is more sympathetic to the victims of
pollution. As a result, the Shapley value derived from the
new specification of the characteristic function gives Bob
and Carol a relatively high allocation. Thus, I reiterate the
point I made earlier that a critical issue is how the analyst
abstracts from the context of the problem.79 To a large
degree, fairness analysis depends on how reference points
are chosen. One advantage of this formal approach is that it
makes the effect of an analyst's assumption quite clear.
Having just stated that fairness analysis depends on
reference points to a large degree, I hasten to add that the
choice of solution concept is also very important. The
nucleolus is a leading alternative to the Shapley value as a
solution concept for cooperative games. In some problems
the two solution concepts will give similar outcomes; in
other problems they diverge widely. To a large degree, the
choice of a solution concept depends on the analyst's moral
intuition. Once the analyst understands how different
solution concepts work, he or she can make a choice based
on which one more closely comports with the analyst's
moral intuition.
In Part III, I will compare the axiomatic basis of the
nucleolus and the Shapley value, but for now I am content
to apply the concepts to the problem at hand and compare
the results. Given the first specification of the characteristic
function, the nucleolus yields a payoff of 5 for Ann and 5 for
both Bob and Carol (compared to 5'/ for Ann and 4I/ for Bob
and Carol under the Shapley value). Given the second
specification, the nucleolus yields a payoff of 3 for Ann and
6 for Bob and Carol (the same asunder the Shapley value).
Let me explain the derivation of the nucleolus and why
the solution concepts diverge for the first specification and
agree for the second. The nucleolus creates a rough parity
among all coalitions by maximizing satisfaction experienced
by each coalition. I judge satisfaction by comparing the
payoffs allocated to the members of a coalition by a
potential solution to the payoff specified for that coalition
by the characteristic function. For example, the nucleolus
associated with the first characteristic function allocates a
payoff of 5 to Ann. Her level of satisfaction is the gap
compared to 5 before, and she contributes 3 to the grand coalition {A, B, C1
compared to 7 before.
79. See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 122 (framing effects in bargaining).
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between that payoff, and the payoff given by the
characteristic function v(A) = 4. I will say that her
satisfaction level is equal to 1. For Bob and Carol the
satisfaction level is also equal to 1, because the nucleolus
allocates them a payoff of 5 each, whereas the characteristic
functions specifies v(B) = v(C) = 4. Now consider the
doubleton coalitions. Ann and Bob together get a payoff of 5
+ 5 = 10 under the nucleolus compared to the payoff of
v(A,B) = 9 specified by the characteristic function. Their
satisfaction level is also 1. The same level of satisfaction is
achieved by the coalition of Ann and Carol. The coalition of
Bob and Carol gets a satisfaction level of 2 because together
they get 10 under the nucleolus while v(B,C) = 8. Thus all
coalitions get a payoff at least one in excess of their
characteristic function payoff.8" There is no way to
rearrange the nucleolus payoffs without forcing some
coalition's satisfaction level below 1. Now let's compare the
Shapley value. Ann receives a higher payment and Bob and
Carol receive lower payments compared to the nucleolus.
Obviously, the satisfaction level of the coalitions {B} and {C}
fall below 1 to 5/ Thus the Shapley value allocation
decreases the satisfaction level of two of the least satisfied
coalitions. Of course, by its nature, the Shapley value
rewards parties based on their average marginal
contribution to all coalitions. In this problem the Shapley
value favors Ann relative to the nucleolus because of Ann's
high marginal contributions. Ann's marginal contributions
are relatively large because she is needed to abate the
pollution in an efficient outcome.
Why do the two solution concepts yield an identical
allocation of surplus in the second cooperative game
problem? To understand the answer it helps to calculate the
satisfaction level of each coalition. First note that all
singleton coalitions have a satisfaction level of zero. The
reason is that solution payoffs match the payoffs to the
singleton coalitions given by the characteristic function:
v(A) = 3, and v(B) = v(C) = 6. The doubleton coalitions also
each have a satisfaction level of zero. The Shapley value
payoffs to Ann and Bob (or Ann and Carol) are 3 + 6 = 9
which matches the characteristic function payoff: v(A,B) = 9
80. Of course, for the grand coalition, {A,B,C}, the sum of the individual
nucleolus payoffs is equal to the characteristic function payoff: v(A,B,C) = 15.
This is always true for a grand coalition.
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(or v(A,C) = 9). Similarly, for Bob and Carol 6 + 6 = 12 =
v(B,C). So all coalitions have the same level of zero
satisfaction. It is not possible to rearrange payoffs without
shifting some coalition's satisfaction level to a negative
number. The Shapley value solution and the nucleolus
solution coincide here because of the simple additive
structure implied by the characteristic function. Each
player's marginal contribution to any coalition is constant.
Ann brings the value 3 to every coalition, while Bob and
Carol bring the value 6 to every coalition. In this second
cooperative game, when we reward each player based on his
or her marginal contribution, we are also creating parity
among all of the possible coalitions.
III. THE AXIOMATIC APPROACH

Reviewing the examples in the last section, it is difficult
to choose among the solution concepts-to prefer one as
fairer than the other. One way to develop a preference for a
particular solution is to see how each of the solutions
performs over a broad range of examples. With luck, we will
find that one solution consistently gives sensible and
intuitively fair solutions, while another generates enough
aberrant solutions that we can reject it as a solution
method.8 ' An interesting, alternative way to choose among
solution concepts requires understanding the origin of each
concept in terms of its constitutive axioms.
The game theorist specifies a list of axioms that he or
she thinks a desirable (for moral, aesthetic or other reasons) solution concept should satisfy. He or she then checks
to see whether the axioms are consistent with one another.
Assuming that the axioms are consistent, the game theorist
checks to see which solution concepts satisfy the axioms. As
81. I am not transgressing my rule against global analysis of fairness issues.
I do not mean to suggest that one fairness rule can either answer all questions
about a just society or even that one fairness rule is satisfactory for all problems
of fair division. Rather, I am suggesting that we should make sure that a fair
division method is robust in the sense that it performs well for all plausible
division problems in a particular class.
82. See Donald Wittman, The Geometry of Justice: Three Existence and
Uniqueness Theorems, 16 THEORY AND DECISION 239 (1984) for a lucid and
accessible presentation of the axiomatic approach to fair division between two
parties. Cf NORMAN FROLICH AND JOE A. OPPENHEIMER, CHOOSING JUSTICE: AN
EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH TO ETHICAL THEORY 156-57 (1992) 156-57 (1992)
(expressing skepticism toward an axiomatic approach to distributive justice).
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more and stronger axioms are added to the list, the odds
grow that no solution concept can satisfy them all. A
difficult and happy achievement is to find a min-imally
sufficient list of axioms that can be satisfied by only one
solution concept. When this axiomatic characterization of a
solution concept is achieved, then it makes sense to identify
the moral significance of a solution concept with the content
of its axioms (and the implicit assumptions hidden in the
statement of the problem).
A rough version of the axiomatic characterization of the
Shapley value states:83 it is the unique allocation rule that
is (i) impartial, (ii) Pareto optimal, and (iii) satisfies the
marginality principle. Impartiality means that the
allocation only depends on the relevant specified information. The allocation cannot depend on factors that are
morally arbitrary-like whose name is shorter. Pareto
optimality simply means that all benefits are allocated;
nothing is wasted. In the cost allocation context, Pareto
optimality means that the sum of the allocated costs equals
and does not exceed the required cost of the project. The
marginality principle requires that a player's allocation
depends only on that player's marginal contributions to all
possible coalitions.84
A rough version of the axiomatic characterization of the
nucleolus states:85 it is the unique allocation rule that is (i)
impartial, (ii) Pareto optimal, (iii) homogeneous, (iv) separable, and (v) satisfies the consistency principle. The first
two axioms also appear in the characterization of the
Shapley value. The marginality principle in the Shapley
value characterization is replaced in the nucleolus characterization by homogeneity, separability, and consistency.
Costs or benefits are separable if they are solely
attributable to one player. A solution concept satisfies
separability if it allocates the separable portion of cost or
benefit to the responsible party. A solution concept is
homogeneous when scaling up costs or benefits scales the
allocation in the same way." Roughly speaking, a solution
concept is consistent if it gives the same allocation over a
group of players when the number of players in the game is
83. See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 200.
84. I will explain this principle further below.
85. See Young, supra note 12, at 201-204.
86. The Shapley value satisfies the separability and homogeneity axioms,
but they are not needed to characterize the Shapley value.
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scaled up or down in a regular way."
The essential differences between the Shapley value
and the nucleolus can be traced to the, difference between
the marginality principle used to characterize the former
and the consistency principle used to characterize the
latter. I will explore the relative merits of the two axioms by
explaining how they can be violated. Specifically, I will
describe why the nucleolus fails the marginality principle
and why the Shapley value fails the consistency principle.
Let me show that the nucleolus violates the marginality
principle by returning to the problem of apportioning
damages among three polluters. Recall the goal is to divide
fairly the 400 unit cost of pollution between Xerxes, Yves,
and Zack. The cooperative game specified the following
characteristic function: c(0) = 0, c(X) = 100, c(Y) = 200, c(Z)
= 300, c(XY) = 300, c(X,Z) = 400, c(Y,Z) = 400, and c(XY,Z)
= 400. The marginality principle is built upon the notion of
a player's marginal contribution. A player's marginal
contribution is measured by the change in the value of a
coalition when the player is removed from the coalition.
Thus Xerxes makes a marginal contribution of 100 to the
coalition {X,Y} because c(XY) - c(Y) = 300 - 200 = 100.
Similarly, Xerxes makes a marginal contribution of 100 to
the coalitions {X, Z} and {X}. Finally, Xerxes makes a
marginal contribution of 0 to the coalition {X, Y, Z} because
c(X,Y,Z) - c(Y,Z) = 400 - 400 = 0. The marginality principle
dictates that a solution concept gives the same allocation to
a player if that player makes the same marginal
contributions in two different cooperative games."
To apply the marginality principle, I will modify the
pollution cost sharing game in a way that keeps Xerxes'
marginal contributions constant. The new cooperative game
has the same characteristic function, except c(Y) is reduced
from 200 to 100, and c(XY) is reduced from 300 to 200.89
The marginal contributions by Xerxes are the same in the
two games.9" As required, the new Shapley value satisfies
87. As a precise definition is difficult to understand, I will illustrate the
consistency principle with an example below.
88. The set of players is the same in the two games.
89. In the new game Yves' costs are symmetric with Xerxes' costs.
90. In the new problem Xerxes' marginal contribution to the coalition {X,Y}
is still 100 because c(XY) - c(Y) = 200 - 100. The marginal contributions of

Xerxes to the coalitions {X}, XZI and {X,Y,Z} are unchanged in the two
problems, because c(0), c(X), c(X,Z), c(Z), c(YZ), and c(XY,Z) are all unchanged.
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the marginality principle because Xerxes' cost allocation
does not change. The Shapley value allocation to Xerxes
remains 66(2/3), the allocation to Yves falls from 116(2/3) to
66(2/3), and the allocation to Zack rises from 216(2/3) to
266(2/3). The nucleolus violates the marginality principle
because the cost allocated to Xerxes rises despite the fact
his marginal contributions are unchanged. The nucleolus in
the new problem allocates a cost of 662/3) to Xerxes
compared to 50 in the original problem.9 This example
provides intuitive support for the marginality axiom
because it seems unfair to make Xerxes pay more when his
marginal contributions are unchanged, and the total
damage of 400 is unchanged.
The consistency principle is also intuitively appealing,
but it points toward the nucleolus rather than the Shapley
value. The consistency principle requires that an allocation
rule yields consistent results when it is applied to one
cooperative game that is derived from another by changing
the number of players. I can illustrate the consistency
principle by returning to the first estate division problem.2
Yves had a claim of 200 and Zack had a claim of 300 to an
estate with 300 in assets. Recall that both the nucleolus and
the Shapley value yielded an allocation of 100 for Yves and
200 for Zack.93 Now consider a similar problem with
everything doubled: there are four claimants instead of two;
the assets in the estate are doubled to 600; Yves and new
player Yvette each have a claim of 200; and Zack and new
player Zeke each have a claim of 300. As one might expect,
the nucleolus allocates 100 to both Yves and Yvette, and
200 to both Zack and Zeke - not so the Shapley value. The
Shapley value allocation gives 116(2/3) to both Yves and
Yvette, and 183(1/3) to both Zack and Zeke.94 The
consistency principle is violated by the Shapley value as
applied to these two fair division problems.
To recapitulate the discussion so far in Part III, the
marginality principle and the consistency principle offer
alternative axiomatic bases for constituting a rule of fair
division. If an analyst finds the marginality principle more
attractive, then he or she should choose the Shapley value
91. The allocation to Yves falls from 125 to 66(2/3), and the allocation to
Zack rises from 225 to 266(2/3).
92. See text at notes 40-45.
93. Given the characteristic function with v(Y) = 200 and v(Z) = 300.
94. See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 71.
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as a solution concept. If the analyst finds the consistency
principle more attractive, then he or she should choose the
nucleolus.
I will conclude this part by describing two desirable
properties of fair division rules: one property is satisfied
only by the Shapley value, and the other is not satisfied by
the Shapley value at all.
The first property, which holds only for the Shapley
value, is the monotonicity condition.95 Roughly speaking,
when two cooperative games are compared, if the payoffs of
all coalitions are greater in the second game than the first,
then the payoffs to all players must be greater in the second
game." The nucleolus sometimes violates this condition. It
is possible that external changes that increase the surplus
available to everyone actually reduce some player's
nucleolus payoff. Not only does monotonicity seems intuitively desirable, it also has political-economic significance.
To the extent that legal policy represents a fair bargain
among interest groups, it is desirable that the bargain does
not have to be reworked in the face of exogenous social or
economic changes. An exogenous change that increases
total surplus may reduce some player's nucleolus payoff.
Such an event would provoke demands for revision of the
sharing rule to protect the player that suffers.97 This type of
problem is avoided by the Shapley value.
The second desirable property concerns the temptation
of coalitions to defect from a joint enterprise. The nucleolus
is preferable to the Shapley value on the grounds that the
nucleolus is more resistant to threats of defection. The
nucleolus is designed to minimize the dissatisfaction of each
coalition. It gives every coalition a payoff greater than the
coalition's characteristic function payoff - whenever that is
possible.98 The same cannot be said of the Shapley value.
95. The marginality principle is the key to assuring that the monotonicity
condition is satisfied.
96. See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 200.
97. See ZAJAC, supra note 14, at 121-22.
98. An economic concept called the core is useful here. The core is defined to
be the set of feasible allocations that cannot be blocked by the objection of some
coalition. Any coalition that can do better on its own that it does with a
suggested allocation is allowed to object. Intuitively, the core is the set of allocations that are resistant to defection. See MOULIN, supra note 11, at 403-06;
YOUNG, supra note 12, at 85. Unfortunately, the core does not exist for all
cooperative games. In other words, for some cooperative games, at least one
coalition will object to any possible allocation. The nucleolus is especially
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The following example illustrates a problem of defection
that afflicts the Shapley value but not the nucleolus.99
Suppose that three communities, A, B, and C, agree to build
and share a wastewater treatment facility. The
characteristic function specifies the benefit to each coalition
of communities from building the facility on their own.
Suppose the characteristic function gives the following
payoffs:
v(A) = v(B) = v(C) =2
v(A,B) = v(A,C) = 5
v(B,C) = 7
v(A,B,C) = 9.
The communities clearly benefit from cooperation since
each pair of communities and the coalition of all three
communities get benefits that exceed the sum of the
benefits when the communities are on their own. The
Shapley value allocation for this problem gives a payoff of
21/. to community A, and 31/, to communities B and C. A
weakness of the Shapley value in this setting is that
communities B and C could defect from the three
community project and get a higher pafyoff on their own: the
Shapley value gives the pair 3'/3 + 3 /3 = 62/3 compared to
v(B,C) = 7. The nucleolus for this cooperative game gives
community A a payoff of 2, and communities B and C get
payoffs of 3/ each. B and C do as well under the nucleolus
as they could do on their own. No coalition has an incentive
to defect under the nucleolus allocation.
Defection is obviously relevant to fair division problems
in which players voluntarily participate in a joint
enterprise.' It deserves attention, but is less relevant in
fair division problems in which participation is mandated
by the government. Voluntary participation is present for
many collective decisions like the water treatment project.
Other examples include international economic and
resistant to defection because it is defined in such a way that it is always in the
core if the core exists. See id. at 201-02.
99. For similar examples see MOULIN, supra note 11, at 24-25; YOUNG, supra
note 12, at 82-84.
100. The reader should notice that I am mingling normative and positive
theory here. Cooperative games and their solutions concern how should a group
divide costs or benefits. Whether members of a group can and will defect is a
positive question. The link that I am drawing is based on the notion that
defection will not occur if every coalition is doing as well under the solution of
the game as they could on their own. Economists use the core to examine this
link.
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environmental treaties, joint ventures, and partnerships.
There is no point embracing an allocation method as fair if
some players object to their allocation and actually have an
incentive to leave the joint enterprise. 1 In most of the fair
division problems discussed in this review, the allocation is
mandated and players do not have an option of leaving the
joint enterprise. Nevertheless, there is a normative
argument that the nucleolus is desirable because it is
consistent with a goal of autonomy since coalitions receive
an allocation that is at least as good as what they can
achieve on their own (when this is possible). A sensible
rejoinder to the autonomy argument is that sometimes it is
just for one coalition to subsidize another. The universal
service requirement in public utility regulation is a
prominent example of a mandated subsidy policy. 12

IV. FAIRNESS AND EFFICIENCY
Moulin and Young address two main criticisms of the
use of cooperative game theory or other notions of end-state
justice to guide legal policy-making. The first criticism
holds that fair division of cost or benefit ignores economic
efficiency. The second criticism holds that fair division
should be assessed with reference to procedural rather than
end-state justice. The authors are sensitive to both
criticisms and believe that end-state analysis must
accommodate concerns about efficiency and process. In this
part of the Review I will mention some of the highlights of
analysis that combines efficiency with end-state justice. In
the next part of the Review I will discuss fair process.
Two efficiency issues frequently arise in fair division
problems. One is the problem of shirking. I use that term
broadly to cover both the free-rider problem 3 and the moral
hazard problem. Generally, the issue is whether parties
101. Notice that defection is not always a problem with the Shapley value.
Recall the earlier discussion of the bidder cartel that settled on the Shapley
value as a fair way to distribute the gains from collusion. That cartel was
remarkably resistant to defection. The important point is that the very
construction of the nucleolus assures that coalition dissatisfaction is minimized.
102. See ZAJAC, supra note 14, at 134, 203-10.
103. Free-riding occurs when people who benefit from a public good avoid
paying for it. See MOULIN, supra note 11, at 27, 340.
104. Moral hazard occurs when a person deviates from an agreed course of
action and takes an action that advances personal interests. See ZAJAC, supra
note 14, at 60-61.
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will take private actions that optimally advance a joint
project. The other efficiency issue concerns strategic
misrepresentation of information by parties holding private
information. °5
Self-interested parties usually will not take optimal
actions to advance the common good. They tend to shirk
their responsibility because they personally bear the cost of
effort, resource contribution, or investment in the joint
project. The government can eliminate the free-rider
problem through coercion, and firms can mitigate or eliminate the problem by building cooperative institutions like
joint ventures or trade associations. Moral hazard can also
be eliminated, provided that inefficient actions can be
observed and verified. Governmental fiat or private contract
can assure efficient action given observability and
verifiability. 6
If a public good like a dam is funded by voluntary
contributions there is likely to be an inefficiently low level
of funding. In this setting, free-riders are users who benefit
from the dam, but contribute less than their fair share to
the cost of the dam. If the government provides the dam,
then governmental fiat eliminates the free rider problem.
The government can use general tax revenues or user fees
to fund the project. Here, reliance on distributive justice to
divide fairly the cost of the dam avoids the shirking
problem.
Yet many public goods are provided by the private
sector without serious shirking problems. Suppose, for
example, three oil companies hire an exploration company
to investigate oil deposits at a remote site. The companies
agree they will share the resulting information. The
companies certainly care about the incentive effects of their
contract with the exploration company. But efficiency issues
recede when it comes to dividing the cost of this simple joint
venture. The companies are likely to use some fairness
criterion to guide their decision about how they will share
the cost of compensating the exploration company. The
companies can handle the free-rider problem with a
contract that binds them to sharing the compensation
105. See YOUNG, supranote 12, at 130-31.
106. Economists apply the term observable to information shared by the
parties to a contract. They apply the term verifiable to information shared by
the parties and the trier of fact at trial.
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cost. 107
The power of contract is also a key to assuring efficient
actions are taken in the presence of moral hazard. Moral
hazard is an issue in the nuisance problem in Part II
because the polluter has an incentive to cheat on an
agreement to abate her polluting activity. In my earlier
discussion I used fairness criteria to assign property rights
without regard to possible inefficiencies. Assuming the
victims can observe the polluting action, the parties will set
the optimal level of abatement by contract. Following
Coase, if transaction costs are sufficiently low, then
contract rights, not property rights, assure efficiency.
Shirking and similar problems occur when actions are
unobservable. The government cannot assure compliance
with regulations, and private parties cannot assure
compliance with contracts if relevant actions cannot be
observed. Inefficiency, however, is not inevitable. Optimal
actions can still be induced if parties are provided the right
incentives.
The sharing rules in a joint project can be chosen to
ameliorate undesirable incentives for parties to choose
inefficient activities. For example, if a party's share of the
benefit from a joint venture depends indirectly on his or her
effort, that creates a positive incentive to exert effort. Equal
benefit-sharing in partnership does not give partners much
of an incentive to exert effort that will contribute to the
partnership's profit. If sharing is proportional to an indirect
measure of effort like attracting new clients, then a greater
and more efficient incentive is provided. The main problem
with unobservable actions is that sharing rules that provide
proper incentives often clash with sharing rules that assure
a fair end-state. °8
Strategic misrepresentation of private information is
the second efficiency problem. I alluded to this problem in
the second estate division example.0 9 An efficient allocation
scheme should give the painting left in the estate to the
party who values it the most. I assumed that the priest
knew who valued the painting the most, and even the
107. More precisely, the availability of contract law diminishes the impact of
free-riding. Although the contract between the three companies deters freeriding after an agreement, there is still a temptation to free ride by refusing to
sign an agreement or by demanding a small cost share.
108. See MOULIN, supranote 11, at 22 and sections 6.4 and 6.5.
109. See supratext accompanying notes 46-51.

968

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

precise value both Yves and Zack attached to the painting.
Often such information will not be available and there is a
danger of misallocation. The efficiency loss is measured by
the gap between the highest value user and the player who
actually receives the item. The inefficiency can be alleviated
if the parties can trade items once they are allocated. If
trade is possible, then the inefficiency cost is reduced to the
cost of the transaction.
Another danger created by the information revelation
problem is that the decision whether to build a public
project like a dam, and also the size of the project, may be
distorted. If users know that their payment for the dam will
be proportional to their benefit, then they have an incentive
to understate their benefit. If the government believes the
understated valuations, then it could mistakenly decide to
cancel a project or reduce its scale because costs appear
large in comparison to benefits.
Private information does not always create efficiency
problems."' Some people will report their private
information honestly regardless of the consequences to
themselves. Other people are deterred from lying because
they fear getting caught and the resulting shame or
punishment. Deterrence requires some probability that
liars are detected and punished. This is not possible with
some kinds of information that cannot be verified in court;
e.g., how strongly a person desires a public good. Even
when detection is not feasible or effective, sharing rules are
another source of incentives for truth-telling."'
In the following example the sharing rule achieves both
the fairness and efficiency goals. Consider a public project
that will serve Ann, Bob, and Carol. The expected benefits
to each party from an optimally designed project are equal.
Suppose that there are two design choices: X or Y. Further
suppose that there are two possible states of the world: x or
y, and that Ann and Bob observe the true state of the world,
110. The collusive bidders at the used machinery auction dealt with the
information revelation problem effectively. They chose a mechanism that
induced the high value party to identify themselves. The mechanism also
implemented the Shapley value allocation of the gains from collusion. See
Graham et al., supranote 58.
111. There is a vast literature in economics that addresses the goal of
getting parties to reveal their (private) preference information concerning a
public good. See e.g., JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT, FUNDAMiiENTALS OF PUBLIC Ec-
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while Carol and the government manager in charge of the
project simply know that x and y are equally likely. Assume
that choice X is optimal given x is the true state of the
world. Similarly, Y is optimal given y. Finally, assume that
Ann prefers project X and Bob prefers project Y regardless
of the true state of the world. The problem for the manager
is to fairly assign the costs of the project and induce Ann
and Bob truthfully to reveal their information. There is a
simple sharing rule that is fair and induces truthfulness. If
Ann and Bob report the same state of the world, then the
manager should believe their reports and choose the
product design that is optimal for the reported state. The
costs of the project are divided equally between Ann, Bob,
and Carol. If Ann and Bob make inconsistent reports, then
the manager should randomly choose a product design and
divide the costs of the project equally between just Ann and
Bob. The equilibrium outcome consists of truthful reports,
optimal project design, and equal cost sharing, despite the
private information and the conflicting interests of Ann and
Bob."'
There is no consensus about how conflicting fairness
and efficiency imperatives should be resolved. Moulin
believes there is frequent conflict between the goals of
efficiency and fairness."' When conflict is inescapable he
favors an intuitive balancing between the two interests. 4
Young believes that the degree of conflict is overstated, and
that fairly assigning entitlements in the context of compe-5
titive markets is often the best approach to public policy."
Generally, law and economics scholars shy away from a
112. The following numbers can be used to illustrate the example. The cost
of the project is 9. The benefit to Carol when the project design matches the
state is 9. The benefit to Carol is 0 otherwise. The benefit to Ann is: 10 if the
state is x and the design is X; 9 if the state is y and the design is X; 8 if the state
is y and the design is Y; and 6 if the state is x and the design is Y. The benefit to
Bob is: 8 if the state is x and the design is X; 6 if the state is y and the design is
X; 10 if the state is y and the design is Y; and 9 if the state is x and the design is
Y. The equilibrium reports of Ann and Bob will be the true state. All three get
an expected payoff of 6.
113. See MOULIN,supra note 11, at 22 (discussing the tension between efficiency and equity).
114. See id. at 163 (endorses an approach to fair division that defines "reasonable tests of equity, selecting as often as possible a small subset of efficient
and 'just' outcomes.").
115. See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 161 (stating the trade-off is "largely
chimerical"); id. at 19 (justifying competitive markets with fairly defined entitlements as equitable).
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serious analysis of fairness issues when efficiency is a
concern. The usual justification is that particular policies
can be designed on the basis of efficiency. If the result is an
unfair distribution of wealth, then society can address that
problem via government taxes and transfers."6 I agree with
Moulin and Young that fairness and efficiency issues should
be faced as they arise, but that topic is too complex for me
to comment on here." 7

V. FAIR PROCESS

Fair outcomes are the main concern of both authors, but
they both recognize that fairness depends on means as well
as ends, and they both comment at length on economic
analysis of procedural fairness."' Most of the economic
interest in process relates to implementation of a fair endstate allocation." 9 Courts, legislatures, and arbitrators face
116. Compare Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, "Why the Legal System is
Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income," 23 J. Legal Stud.
667 (1994) (arguing that the income redistribution policies should be done
through the tax system not legal rules. The problem with legal rules is that
redistributional policies are likely to be directly inefficient in the market
affected by the legal rule and indirectly inefficient through their impact on the
labor-leisure choice. In contrast, the income tax only distorts the labor-leisure
choice.) with Chris William Sanchirico, Taxes Versus Legal Rules as
Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View, USC Law School, Working
Paper No. 98-21 (June 1998) (stating the Kaplow and Shavell result is not
robust to various changes in their modeling assumptions. Particular attention is
paid to heterogeneity of tortfeasors.)
117. There are three problems with the usual approach to fairness in law
and economics. First, fairness is manifest in dimensions other than wealth or
income inequality. I doubt that fiscal policy is the appropriate venue to address
fairness issues raised by most of the fair division problems discussed earlier in
this review. Second, political reality may favor interventions for the sake of
fairness at the level of particular policies rather in the general fiscal policy
arena. Third, the claim that fairness can be assured more efficiently through
fiscal policy is open to challenge.
118. See MOULIN, supra note 11, at 36-44; YOUNG, supra note 12, at 130-45.
119. For an extensive discussion of "cake-cutting" methods that can be used
to implement fair outcomes see generally BRAMS AND TAYLOR, supra note 50
(commenting that cake-cutting requires that one party divides resources that
will be shared. The other party or parties get first choice among the allotments
of resources. The name comes from the just solution parents use to settle
distributional fights among children.); see also Moulin, supra note 24, at 2-3, 1112 (Economists study fair procedure by specifying a game that implements a
social choice. The "rights" of a player in the game are modeled as the set of
actions available to the player under the rules of the game.). The concept of
implementation is explained in KEN BiNmORE, FUN AND GArvEs: A TEXT ON GAmE
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constraints in implementing fair end-states because they
have limited knowledge and power. Economic analysis is
used to derive processes that implement desired end-states
despite these constraints. Alternatively, economic analysis
is used to show what ends are feasible given limited
knowledge and power. 20
In the second estate division problem I skirted the
question of implementation by supposing that the priest
knew the valuations that Yves and Zack attached to the
painting. In fact, there is a simple auction process that
implements the end-state in which Yves takes the painting
and pays $200 to Zack. 2 ' The priest simply puts the
painting up for public auction and lets Yves and Zack split
the proceeds. Yves would submit a winning bid of $400,
take the painting, and pay half of the winning bid to Zack.
The preceding example shows that sometimes a fair
end-state can be implemented despite private information.
Closer attention to the example reveals another potential
implementation problem: a wealth constraint. If Yves has
wealth less than $200, the supposed transfer is not feasible.
The outcome of the public auction would be an inefficient
sale to a third party, and Yves and Zack would split the
proceeds of $400.
A third implementation difficulty is caused by collusion
between the players.2 2 Recall the discussion of the
allocation of pollution damages between Xerxes, Yves, and
Zack. For heuristic purposes I suggested that the Shapley
value could be interpreted in terms of a lottery that determined the order in which the players made payments to
satisfy the damage claim. For example, whoever draws the
shortest straw makes the first payment. Whoever draws the
longest straw makes the last payment (if any payment is
still required after the first two). One problem with this
lottery approach is that Xerxes and Zack have an incentive
to collude." In an effective collusive agreement Xerxes
531 (1992).
120. Cf., Roger Myerson & Mark Satterthwaite, "Efficient Mechanisms for
Bilateral Trading," 29 J. ECON. THEORY 265 (1983) (impossibility of finding a
bargaining mechanism that is voluntary, unsubsidized, and leads to trade if and
only if trade is efficient).
121. The task of implementing the end-state in which both Yves and Zack
get a payoff of 5 is more difficult.
122. See MOULIN, supra note 11, at 79.
123. Alternatively, Xerxes and Yves could collude against Zack.
THEORY

972

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

would always take Zack's straw if Zack had a shorter straw.
In return, Zack would compensate Xerxes for the extra
expense. The result of the collusion is to shift more of the
damages to Yves. 24
In addition to the implementation problem, Moulin and
Young use economic methods to analyze particular
processes. 5 They choose candidate fair division processes
and analyze their efficiency and end-state justice attributes.
The fairness of a particular process is assessed by factors
like: do players have an individual or group incentive to
lie;126 are players coerced; 7 are glayers ignored; and can one
player dictate

the outcome.

In

some examples

an

apparently fair process may be inefficient 29 or lead to a
patently unfair end-state. 3 ° In other examples, it is possible
to achieve a degree of fairness in both process and outcome
as well as efficiency. I will illustrate the combined analysis
of process, outcome and efficiency with brief comments on
Moulin's treatment of voting rules.'
Moulin compares two arguably fair voting schemes that
might be used to resolve a social choice problem. The social
124. Yves would have to pay 16(2/3) more because of the collusion. Xerxes
and Zack could agree to any split of the cost savings.
125. See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 42-63 (legislative apportionment), 156-61
(assignment of students to dormitory rooms); MOULIN, supra note 11, at 205-13
(divide and choose and auctions).
126. See MOULIN, supranote 11, at 40, 195.
127. As I explained in Part III when participation in the joint project is
voluntary the end-state must be chosen so that no coalition of players has an
incentive to defect from the grand coalition. In other words, the end-state must
be in the core. Players must be coerced to accept an allocation outside of the
core. See supra notes 92-93.
128. See MOULIN, supranote 24, at 7-8.
129. See infra text accompanying notes 124-25.
130. See MOULIN, supra note 24, at 7 (Fair procedures can produce unfair
outcomes. In some cases the voluntary provision of a public good results in all
costs of provision falling to one party. Also "in the celebrated 'gloves market'
with 101 owners of a right glove and 100 owners of a left glove the unique core
allocation gives all the surplus to the left glove owners.").
131. Young has an extensive treatment of a market-like process. See YOUNG,
supranote 12, at 151-61. He argues that when there are different kinds of items
to allocate and people have diverse preferences over those items then it is
important to try to achieve an efficient allocation, and that the market is often
an attractive method of achieving fair and efficient allocations. See id. at 161.
("Competitive markets allocate property both efficiently and equitably provided
the goods were equitably allocated to begin with.") Id. Assuming rationality,
people will trade from their initial endowments in a way that makes everyone
better off. We see market-like forces in action when children trade food from
their school lunch.
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choice concerns the provision of a public good. In one of
Moulin's examples he supposes that a group of five
neighbors who live in adjoining condominiums decide to
share the joint cost of hiring a gardener to care for a
garden." 2 The neighbors are assumed to combine equal cost
sharing, a notion of end-state justice, with either majority
or unanimity voting as a fair process for eliciting preference
information. Although unanimity voting respects a
voluntary participation constraint, majority voting is more
efficient.
Moulin illustrates the problem by supposing that the
arden gives the neighbors the following benefits in dollars:
800, $600, $450, $350, and $300 for a total value of $2500.
The cost of the gardener is $2000, so the project is efficient
if the benefits are commensurable and weighted equally.
Equal cost sharing of $400 implies that two of the neighbors
will suffer a loss. The project will not be undertaken given a
unanimous voting rule. Two of the neighbors will object to
the project because they would have to pay more than they
get. In contrast, the project will be approved using a
majority voting rule with equal cost sharing. The vote
would be three in favor and two opposed. So majority voting
leads to an efficient outcome while unanimity does not.
Majority voting does not always yield efficiency. If the
resident holding the value of $450 is assigned a lower value
of $350, then an inefficient result occurs. The total value of
a gardener is now $2400 and the garden's value still
exceeds its cost, but a majority of residents now oppose the
plan. A possible remedy for this inefficiency is to change the
cost sharing rule. In the original problem, if costs are
shared proportionally to benefits then the costs are
allocated: (640, 480, 360, 280, 240). The neighbors will now
unanimously vote for to hire the gardener, if and only if it is
efficient to do so. Of course, the allure of the proportional
rule fades once we recall that the residents have an
incentive to understate their benefit to reduce their cost
share.13
132. See MOULIN, supranote 11, at 23-24.
133. See id., at 325. A different approach studied in the same chapter is
voluntary contribution to the production of the public good. Like the two voting
procedures, voluntary contribution usually leads to inefficiently low levels of
production, but it is not systematically lower than the level under the voting
procedures. Id. at 339-49.
134. With equal cost sharing no one has an incentive to lie. Cf YOUNG,
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CONCLUSION

I conclude with brief remarks on a bothersome question: If these books are so valuable for legal scholarship,
why aren't they read and cited more often by legal scholars
- after all, they were written four and five years ago? There
are two plausible answers to that question, but only one
that I can accept. First, the methods of cooperative microeconomics are too hard to apply and the results obtained
from these methods are too weak to be interesting. Second,
this subfield of microeconomic theory is relatively obscure
and no one has noticed its potential usefulness in law and
economics. Of course, I favor the second answer.
The purpose of this review was to introduce the
methods of cooperative microeconomics to an audience of
legal scholars. The task was fairly easy because so many of
the canonical problems studied by Moulin and Young are
directly relevant to legal policy. The examples I have
presented in this Review are certainly accessible to noneconomists and at the same time they offer rich insights
into problems of fair division. With a nascent interest in
fairness appearing in law and economics the time is ripe to
apply cooperative game theory and other methods from
cooperative microeconomics to the study of legal policy.

supranote 12, at 23 (proportional rule might create bad incentives).

